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Abstract
Motivated by the quantum algorithm in [MN05] for testing commutativity of black-box groups, we
study the following problem: Given a black-box finite ring R = 〈r1, · · · , rk〉 where {r1, r2, · · · , rk} is
an additive generating set for R and a multilinear polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm) over R also accessed as a
black-box function f : Rm → R (where we allow the indeterminates x1, · · · , xm to be commuting or
noncommuting), we study the problem of testing if f is an identity for the ring R. More precisely, the
problem is to test if f(a1, a2, · · · , am) = 0 for all ai ∈ R.
• We give a quantum algorithm with query complexity O(m(1 + α)m/2k mm+1 ) assuming k ≥ (1 +
1/α)m+1. Towards a lower bound, we also discuss a reduction from a version of m-collision to
this problem.
• We also observe a randomized test with query complexity 4mmk and constant success probability
and a deterministic test with km query complexity.
1 Introduction
For any finite ring (R,+, ·) the ring R[x1, x2, · · · , xm] is the ring of polynomials in commuting variables
x1, x2, · · · , xm and coefficients in R. The ring R{x1, x2, · · · , xm} is the ring of polynomials where the
indeterminates xi are noncommuting. By noncommuting variables, we mean xixj − xjxi 6= 0 for i 6= j.
For the algorithmic problem we study in this paper, we assume that that the elements of the ring (R,+, ·)
are uniformly encoded by binary strings of length n and R = 〈r1, r2, · · · , rk〉 is given by an additive
generating set {r1, r2, · · · , rk}. That is,
R = {
∑
i
αiri | αi ∈ Z}.
Also, the ring operations of R are performed by black-box oracles for addition and multiplication that
take as input two strings encoding ring elements and output their sum or product (as the case may be).
Additionally, we assume that the zero element of R is encoded by some fixed string. We now define the
problem which we study in this paper.
The Multilinear Identity Testing Problem (MIT): The input to the problem is a black-box ring R =
〈r1, · · · , rk〉 given by an additive generating set, and a multilinear polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm) (in the ring
R[x1, · · · , xm] or the ring R{x1, · · · , xm}) that is also given by black-box access. The problem is to test if
f is an identity for the ring R. More precisely, the problem is to test if f(a1, a2, · · · , am) = 0 for all ai ∈ R.
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A natural example of an instance of this problem is the bivariate polynomial f(x1, x2) = x1x2 − x2x1
over the ring R{x1, x2}. This is an identity for R precisely when R is a commutative ring. Clearly, it
suffices to check if the generators commute with each other which gives a naive algorithm that makes O(k2)
queries to the ring oracles.
Given a polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm) and a black-box ring R by generators, we briefly recall some facts
about the complexity of checking if f = 0 is an identity for R. The problem can be NP-hard when the
number of indeterminates m is unbounded, even when R is a fixed ring. To see this, notice that a 3-CNF
formula F (x1, · · · , xn) can be expressed as a O(n) degree multilinear polynomial f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) over
F2, by writing F in terms of addition and multiplication over F2. It follows that f = 0 is an identity for F2
if and only if F is an unsatisfiable formula.
We remark that a closely related problem is Polynomial Identity Testing (PIT). For PIT we ask whether
the polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm) is the zero polynomial, which is a stronger property. To see the difference,
consider a standard example: For a prime p, notice that xp − x = 0 is an identity for Fp but xp − x is not a
zero polynomial in Fp[x]. However, when the ring R is a field F and the degree of f is smaller than the size of
the field F then the two problems coincide as a consequence of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80, Zip79].
More precisely, f = 0 is an identity for F if and only if f is the zero polynomial.
When f is given by an arithmetic circuit then PIT is known to be in randomized polynomial time over
fields [Sch80, Zip79] and even finite commutative rings with unity [AB03, AMS08]. This is quite unlike
MIT which can be NP-hard for polynomials over small fields as already observed above.
On the other hand, when f is given by black-box access as a function f : Rm → R then there is no way
to distinguish between the problems PIT and MIT. Algorithmically, they coincide.
Over the years, Polynomial Identity Testing has emerged as an important algorithmic problem [AB03,
KI03]. Due to its significance in complexity theory, PIT has been actively studied in recent years [DS06,
KS07, RS05].
In this paper we focus on the query complexity of multilinear identity testing (MIT). In our query model,
each ring operation, which is performed by a query to the ring oracle, is of unit cost. Furthermore, we
consider each evaluation of f(a1, · · · , am) to be of unit cost for a given input (a1, · · · , am) ∈ Rm. This
model is reasonable because we consider m as a parameter that is much smaller than k.
Our goal is to find upper and lower bounds on the query complexity for the problem. We are interested
in the query complexity for both classical and quantum computation. The main motivation for our study is
a result of Magniez and Nayak in [MN05], where the authors study the quantum query complexity of group
commutativity testing: Let G be a finite black-box group given by a generating set g1, g2, · · · , gk and group
operations are performed by a group oracle. The algorithmic task is to check if G is commutative. For this
problem the authors in [MN05] give a quantum algorithm with query complexity O(k2/3 log k) and time
complexity O(k2/3 log2 k). Furthermore a Ω(k2/3) lower bound for the quantum query complexity is also
shown. The main technical tool for their upper bound result was a method of quantization of random walks
first showed by Szegedy [Sze04]. More recently, Magniez et al in [MNRS07] discovered a simpler and
improved description of Szegedy’s method.
Our starting point is the observation that the Magniez-Nayak result [MN05] for group commutativity
can also be easily seen as a commutativity test for arbitrary finite black-box rings. If R = 〈r1, · · · , rk〉 is a
finite black-box ring and f is the bivariate polynomial f(x1, x2) = x1x2 − x2x1 over the polynomial ring
R{x1, x2} (x1, x2 do not commute). Testing if f = 0 is an identity for R is testing if R is commutative.
It turns out that the Magniez-Nayak results can be easily adapted to obtain similar upper and lower bounds
for the quantum query complexity of the problem. Motivated by this connection we study the problem
of testing multilinear identities for any black-box ring. We crucially need the multilinearity condition to
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generalize a result of Pak [Pak00] to multilinear polynomials. Given a black-box group G = 〈g1, · · · , gk〉
by a generating set, Pak shows in [Pak00] that it suffices to plug in random subproducts of the generators
for variables g and h in the equation gh = hg to check for commutativity. Pak shows that for such random
subproducts gh 6= hg with constant probability if G is nonabelian. If R = 〈r1, · · · , rk〉 is a finite black-
box ring given by an additive generating set, Pak’s result can be easily modified to show the following:
if we plug in random subsums of the generators r1, · · · , rk for the variables x1 and x2 in the polynomial
x1x2 − x2x1, then for noncommutative rings R we will have x1x2 − x2x1 6= 0 with constant probability.
We prove a generalization of this property for any multilinear polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm). Then, using the
Magniez-Nayak technique adapted suitably, we show a quantum algorithm for this problem with quantum
query complexity O(m(1 + α)m/2k
m
m+1 ) when (1 + 1/α)m+1 ≤ k.
For the lower bound result Magniez and Nayak show a reduction from UNIQUE COLLISION: let
f be a function from {1, 2, · · · , k} to {1, 2, · · · , k} given as a oracle, with the promise is that either
there exists a unique collision pair x 6= y such that f(x) = f(y) or f is a permutation. It is known
from earlier work [AS04, Kut05, Amb05] that the quantum query complexity of UNIQUE COLLISION is
Ω(k2/3). In fact Magniez and Nayak define a variant of UNIQUE COLLISION problem, which they call
UNIQUE SPLIT COLLISION problem: Assume k is even. Then, in the Yes instances, one element of the
colliding pair has to come from {1, · · · , k/2} and the other from {k/2 + 1, · · · , k}. Then their paper
shows a reduction from UNIQUE COLLISION to UNIQUE SPLIT COLLISION and finally a reduction from
UNIQUE SPLIT COLLISION to group commutativity testing.
We show a reduction to a somewhat more general version of MIT from a problem that is closely related
to the m-COLLISION problem studied in quantum computation. Given a function f : {1, 2, · · · , k} →
{1, 2, · · · , k} as an oracle and a positive integer m, the task is to determine if there is some element in the
range of f with exactly m pre-images. More precisely, is there an i ∈ [k] such that |f−1(i)| = m? We define
a new problem closely related to m-COLLISION problem, that we call m-SPLIT COLLISION problem. Here
we divide the numbers 1, 2, · · · , k into m consecutive equal-sized intervals (assume k is a multiple of m)
and ask if there is some element in the range of f with exactly one pre image in each of the m intervals. We
show a reduction from m-SPLIT COLLISION to a general version of MIT. We do not know an explicit lower
bound for the quantum query complexity of m-SPLIT COLLISION (unlike UNIQUE SPLIT COLLISION in
[MN05]). The reduction of UNIQUE SPLIT COLLISION to group commutativity testing problem in [MN05]
directly gives a Ω(k2/3) lower bound for the quantum query complexity of the general version of MIT.
However, we do not have a stronger lower bound. Ideally, we would like to have a dependence of m in the
exponent of k.
Our reduction from m-SPLIT COLLISION to MIT uses ideas from automata theory to construct a suit-
able black-box ring. Recently, in [AMS08] we used similar ideas to give a new deterministic polynomial
time identity testing (PIT) algorithm for arithmetic circuits computing sparse and small degree multivariate
polynomial over noncommuting variables.
Remark. Ambainis in [Amb04] showed the quantum upper bound of O(km/m+1) for the m-COLLISION
problem. But Ω(k2/3) is the best known quantum lower bound for m-COLLISION for m = 2 [AS04]. The
quantum query complexity of m-COLLISION has been open for some years.
There is a randomized reduction from m-COLLISION to m-SPLIT COLLISION with success probability
e−m: let f : [k] → [k] be a ’yes’ instance of m-COLLISION, and suppose f−1(i) = {i1, i2, · · · , im}. To
reduce this instance to m-SPLIT COLLISION we pick a random m-partition I1, I2, · · · , Im of the domain [k]
with each |Ij| = k/m. Clearly, with probability e−m the set {i1, i2, · · · , im} will be a split collision for
the function f . Consequently, showing a quantum lower bound of Ω(kα) for m-COLLISION will imply a
quantum lower bound of Ω(kα/em) for m-SPLIT COLLISION and hence to MIT.
3
2 Black-box rings and the quantum query model
As already explained, the ring operations (addition and multiplication) for a black-box ring are performed by
querying a ring oracle. We can modify the definition of black-box ring operations by making them unitary
transforms that can be used in quantum algorithms. For a black-box ring R, we have two oracles OaR and OmR
for addition and multiplication respectively. For any two ring elements r, s, and a binary string t ∈ {0, 1}n
we have OaR|r〉|s〉 = |r〉|r + s〉 and OmR |r〉|s〉|t〉 = |r〉|s〉|rs ⊕ t〉, where the elements of R are encoded as
strings in {0, 1}n. Notice that OaR is a reversible function by virtue of (R,+) being an additive group. On
the other hand, (R, ·) does not have a group structure. Thus we have made OmR reversible by defining it as
a 3-place function OmR : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}3n. When r or s do not encode ring elements these oracles can
compute any arbitrary string.
The query model in quantum computation is a natural extension of classical query model. The basic
difference is that a classical algorithm queries deterministically or randomly selected basis states, whereas a
quantum algorithm can query a quantum state which is a suitably prepared superposition of basis states. For
a black-box ring operation the query operators are simply OaR and OmR (as defined above). For an arbitrary
oracle function F : X → Y , the corresponding unitary operator is OF : |g〉|h〉 → |g〉|h ⊕ F (g)〉. In the
query complexity model, we charge unit cost for a single query to the oracle and all other computations are
free. We will assume that the input black-box polynomial f : Rm → R is given by such an unitary operator
Uf .
All the quantum registers used during the computation can be initialised to |0〉. Then a k-query
algorithm for a black-box ring is a sequence of k + 1 unitary operators and k ring oracle operators:
U0, Q1, U1, · · · , Uk−1, Qk, Uk where Qi ∈ {OaR, OmR , OF } are the oracle queries and Ui’s are unitary opera-
tors. The final step of the algorithm is to measure designated qubits and decide according to the measurement
output.
3 Quantum Algorithm for multilinear Identity Testing
In this section we describe our quantum algorithm for multilinear identity testing MIT. Our algorithm is
motivated by (and based on) the group commutativity testing algorithm of Magniez and Nayak [MN05]. We
briefly explain the algorithm of Magniez and Nayak. Their problem was the following: given a black-box
group G by a set of generators g1, g2, · · · , gk , the task is to find nontrivial upper bound on the quantum query
complexity to determine whether G is commutative. The group operators (corresponding to the oracle) are
OG and OG−1 .
Note that for this problem, there is a trivial classical algorithm (so as quantum) of query complexity
O(k2). In an interesting paper Pak showed a classical randomized algorithm of query complexity O(k) for
the same problem [Pak00]. Pak’s algorithm is based on the following observation (Lemma 1.3 in [Pak00]):
consider a subproduct h = ge11 g
e2
2 · · · gekk where ei’ s are picked uniformly at random from {0, 1}. Then for
any proper subgroup H of G, Prob[h 6∈ H] ≥ 1/2.
One important step of the algorithm in [MN05] is a generalization of Pak’s lemma. Let Sℓ be the set of all
distinct element ℓ tuples of elements from {1, 2, · · · , k}. For u = (u1, · · · , uℓ), define gu = gu1 ·gu2 · · · guℓ .
Let p = ℓ(ℓ−1)+(k−ℓ)(k−ℓ−1)k(k−1) .
Lemma 3.1 [MN05] For any proper subgroup K of G, Probu∈Sℓ [gu 6∈ K] ≥ 1−p2
As a simple corollary of this lemma, Magniez and Nayak show in [MN05] that ifG is nonabelian then for
randomly picked u and v from Sℓ the elements gu and gv will not commute with probability at least (1−p)
2
4 .
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Thus, for noncommutative G there will be at least (1−p)
2
4 fraction of noncommuting pairs (u, v). Call such
pairs as ”marked pairs”. Next, their idea is to do a random walk in the space of all pairs and hit a marked pair
quickly (i.e. using only a few queries to the group oracle). They achieved this by defining a random walk
and quantizing it using [Sze04, MNRS07]. The random walk consists of two independent random walks on
Sℓ. For each u ∈ Sℓ, they maintain a binary tree tu whose leaves corresponds to gu1 , gu2 , · · · , guℓ and the
internal nodes corresponds to the group product of its two children. So gu is computed at the root of tu. The
description of the random walk is simple. Suppose the state is u ∈ Sℓ at some stage. With probability 1/2
the walk will stay at u (this ensures the ergodicity of the walk) and with probability 1/2 do the following:
Pick i uniformly at random from 1, 2, · · · , ℓ and pick j uniformly at random from 1, 2, · · · , k. If j is already
equal to some um, exchange ui and um. Otherwise set ui = j. Recompute the group operations at the nodes
of tu which are affected by this substitution. It is easy to see that tu can be updated using only O(log ℓ)
queries to group oracle. Using a coupling argument of Markov Chain it is shown in [MN05] that the spectral
gap δ of this random walk is at least 18eℓ log ℓ . Since the random walk is ergodic its stationary distribution
will be uniform. So the fraction of the marked states (pairs) in Sℓ × Sℓ will be at least (1−p)
2
4 . Now they
invoke Szegedy’s result to perform a quantum walk on Sℓ× Sℓ and hit a marked element pair. We recall the
statement of Szegedy’s theorem. (For a detailed explanation see the section 2.3 of [MN05])
Theorem 3.2 [Sze04] Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov Chain on a graph G = (V,E) and δ be
the spectral gap of P . Also let M be the set of all marked vertices in V and |M |/|V | ≥ ǫ > 0, whenever
M is nonempty. Then there is a quantum algorithm which determines whether M is nonempty with constant
success probability and query complexity S+O((U+C)/
√
δǫ). S is the set up cost of the quantum process,
U is the update cost for one step of the walk and C is the checking cost.
The set up cost of the Magniez-Nayak algorithm is 2(ℓ−1) and update cost is O(log k). Combined with
Szegedy’s theorem, some calculation shows that the query cost is minimized at ℓ = k2/3 and the quantum
query complexity is O(k2/3 log k).
3.1 Multilinear identity testing (MIT)
Now we are ready to describe our result for multilinear identity testing for a given black-box ring. We
start with describing the problem first. Let R be a black-box ring given by a set of additive generators
{r1, r2, · · · , rk} and f(x1, x2, · · · , xm) over R be a multilinear polynomial also given by a black-box. Our
problem is to test whether f(a1, · · · , am) = 0 for all ai ∈ R.
The first step is a suitable generalization of Pak’s lemma. For any i ∈ [m], consider the set Ri ⊆ R
defined as follows:
Ri = {u ∈ R | ∀(b1, · · · , bi−1, bi+1, · · · , bm) ∈ Rm−1, f(b1, · · · , bi−1, u, bi+1, · · · , bm) = 0}
Clearly, if f is not a zero function from Rm → R, then |Ri| < |R|. In the following lemma, we prove
that if f is not a zero function then |Ri| ≤ |R|/2.
Lemma 3.3 LetR be any finite ring and f(x1, x2, · · · , xm) be a multilinear polynomial over R (commuting
or noncommuting) such that f = 0 is not an identity for R. For i ∈ [m] define
Ri = {u ∈ R | ∀(b1, · · · , bi−1, bi+1, · · · , bm) ∈ Rm−1, f(b1, · · · , bi−1, u, bi+1, · · · , bm) = 0}. (1)
Then Ri is an additive coset of a proper additive subgroup of R and hence |Ri| ≤ |R|/2.
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Proof. Write f = A(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi, xi+1, · · · , xm) + B(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xm) where A is the
sum of all the monomials of f containing xi and B is the sum of the rest of the monomials. Let v1, v2
be any two distinct elements in Ri. Then for any fixed y¯ = (y1, · · · , yi−1, yi+1, · · · , ym) ∈ Rm−1, con-
sider the evaluation of A and B over (y1, · · · , yi−1, v1, yi+1, · · · , ym) and (y1, · · · , yi−1, v2, yi+1, · · · , ym)
respectively. For convenience, we abuse the notation and write,
A(v1, y¯) +B(y¯) = A(v2, y¯) +B(y¯) = 0.
y¯ is an assignment to x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xk and v1, v2 are the assignments to xi respectively. Note
that, as f is a multilinear polynomial, the above relation in turns implies that A(v1 − v2, y¯) = 0.
Consider the set Rˆi, defined as follows: fix any u(i) ∈ Ri.
Rˆi = {x− u(i) | x ∈ Ri}
We claim that Rˆi is an (additive) subgroup of R. We only need to show that Rˆi is closed under the addition
(of R). Consider (x1− u(i)), (x2 − u(i)) ∈ Rˆi. Then (x1− u(i)) + (x2−u(i)) = (x1 + x2− u(i))− u(i). It
is now enough to show that for any y¯ ∈ Rm−1, f(x1 + x2 − u(i), y¯) = 0 (x1 + x2 + u(i) is an assignment
to xi). Again using the fact that f is multilinear, we can easily see the following:
f(x1+x2−u(i), y¯) = A(x1, y¯)+A(x2, y¯)−A(u(i), y¯)+B(y¯) = A(x2, y¯)−A(u(i), y¯) = A(x2−u(i), y¯) = 0.
Note that the last equality follows because x2 and u are in Ri. Hence we have proved that Rˆi is a subgroup
of R. So Ri = Rˆi + u(i) i.e Ri is a coset of Rˆi inside R. Also |Ri| < |R| (f is not identically zero over R).
Thus, finally we get |Ri| = |Rˆi| ≤ |R|/2.
Our quantum algorithm is based on the algorithm of [MN05]. In the rest of the paper we denote by Sℓ the
set of all ℓ size subsets of {1, 2, · · · , k} 1. We follow a quantization of a random walk on Sℓ×· · ·×Sℓ = Smℓ .
For u = {u1, u2, · · · , uℓ}, define ru = ru1 + · · · + ruℓ . Now, we suitably adapt the Lemma 1 of [MN05]
in our context. Let R be a finite ring given by a additive generating set S = {r1, · · · , rk}. W.l.o.g, assume
that r1 is the zero element of R. Let Rˆ be a proper additive subgroup of (R,+). Let j be the least integer in
[k] such that rj 6∈ Rˆ. Since Rˆ is a proper subgroup of R, such a j always exists.
Lemma 3.4 Let Rˆ < R be a proper additive subgroup of R and T be an additive coset of Rˆ in R. Then
Probu∈Sℓ [ru 6∈ T] ≥ 1−p2 , where p = ℓ(ℓ−1)+(k−ℓ)(k−ℓ−1)k(k−1) .
Proof. Let j be the least integer in [k] such that rj 6∈ Rˆ. Since Rˆ is a proper subgroup of R, such a j always
exists. Fix a set u of size ℓ such that 1 ∈ u and j 6∈ u. Denote by v the set obtained from u by deleting 1 and
inserting j. This define a one to one correspondence (matching) between all such pair of (u, v). Moreover
rv = ru + rj (notice that r1 = 0). Then at least one of the element ru or rv is not in T . For otherwise
(rv − ru) ∈ Rˆ implying rj ∈ Rˆ, which is a contradiction.
Therefore,
Probu∈Sℓ [ru ∈ T | j ∈ u xor 1 ∈ u] ≤
1
2
.
1 Notice that in [MN05], the author consider the set of all ℓ tuples instead of subsets. This is important for them as they work in
nonabelian structure in general (where order matters). But we will be interested only over additive abelian structure of a ring and
thus order does not matter for us.
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For any two indices i, j,
Probu∈Sℓ [i, j ∈ u or i, j 6∈ u] =
ℓ(ℓ− 1) + (k− ℓ)(k− ℓ− 1)
k(k− 1) = p.
Thus,
Probu∈Sℓ [ru ∈ T] ≤ (1− p)/2 + p ≤ (1 + p)/2.
This completes the proof.
Let T = Ri in Lemma 3.4, where Ri is as defined in Lemma 3.3.
Suppose f = 0 is not an identity for the ring R. Then, using Lemma 3.4 we show for u1, u2, · · · , um
picked uniformly at random from Sℓ that f(ru1 , · · · , rum) is non zero with non-negligible probability. This
is analogous to [MN05, Lemma 2].
Lemma 3.5 Let f(x1, · · · , xm) be a multilinear polynomial (in commuting or noncommuting indetermi-
nates) over R such that f = 0 is not an identity for the ring R. Then,
Probu1,··· ,um∈Sℓ [f(ru1 , · · · , rum) 6= 0] ≥
(
1− p
2
)m
.
Proof. For i ∈ [m], let Ri be the additive coset defined in Equation 1 of Lemma 3.3. The proof is by
simple induction on m. The proof for the base case of the induction (i.e for m = 1) follows easily from the
definition of Ri and Lemma 3.4. By induction hypothesis assume that the result of this lemma holds for all
t-variate multilinear polynomials g such that g = 0 is not an identity for R with t ≤ m− 1.
Consider the given multilinear polynomial f(x1, x2, · · · , xm). Then by the Lemma 3.3, Rm is a coset
of an additive subgroup Rˆm inside R. Pick um ∈ Sℓ uniformly at random. If f = 0 is not an identity
on R then by Lemma 3.4 we get rum 6∈ Rm with probability at least 1−p2 . Let g(x1, x2, · · · , xm−1) =
f(x1, · · · , xm−1, rum). Since rum 6∈ Rm with probability at least 1−p2 , it follows that g = 0 is not an identity
on R with probability at least 1−p2 . Then, by induction hypothesis, Probu1,··· ,um−1∈Sℓ [g(ru1 , · · · , rum−1) 6=
0] ≥
(
1−p
2
)m−1
. Hence we get, Probu1,··· ,um∈Sℓ [f(ru1 , · · · , rum) 6= 0] ≥
(
1−p
2
)m
, which proves the
lemma.
We observe two simple consequences of Lemma 3.5. Notice that 1−p2 =
ℓ(k−ℓ)
k(k−1) . Letting ℓ = 1 we get
1−p
2 = 1/k, and Lemma 3.5 implies that if f = 0 is not an identity for R then f(a1, · · · , am) 6= 0 for one
of the km choices for the ai from the generating set {r1, · · · , rk}.
Corollary 3.6 There is a deterministic km query algorithm for MIT, where f is m-variate and R is given
by an additive generating set of size k.
Letting ℓ = k/2 in Lemma 3.5 we get 1−p2 ≥ 1/4. Hence we obtain the following randomized test
which makes 4mmk queries.
Corollary 3.7 There is a randomized 4mmk query algorithm for MIT with constant success probability,
where f is m-variate and R is given by an additive generating set of size k.
Remark. Corollary 3.6 can be seen as a generalization of the k2 query deterministic test for commutativity.
Likewise, Corollary 3.7 is analogous to Pak’s O(k) query randomized test for commutativity.
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We use Lemma 3.5 to design our quantum algorithm. Our quantum algorithm is based on a quantization
of a random walk on Smℓ and motivated by the one described in [MN05]. The Lemma 3.5 is used to guarantee
that there will at least
(
1−p
2
)m
fraction of marked points in the space Smℓ i.e the points where f evaluates
to non zero.
Now we describe the random walk on Smℓ which is the main building block of our quantum algorithm.
In fact we only describe the random walk on Sℓ. Over Smℓ , the random walk consists of just m independent
simultaneous random walks on Sℓ.
3.1.1 Random walk on Sℓ
Our random walk can be described as a random walk over a graph G = (V,E) which we define as follows:
The vertices of G are all possible ℓ subsets of [k]. Two vertices are connected by an edge whenever the
corresponding sets differ by exactly one element. Notice that G is a connected ℓ(k − ℓ)-regular graph.
Also G is well known in the literature as Johnson Graph (with parameter (k, ℓ, ℓ − 1)) [BCN89]. Let P
be the normalized adjacency matrix of G with rows and columns are indexed by the subsets of [k]. Then
PXY = 1/ℓ(k − ℓ) if |X ∩ Y | = ℓ − 1 and 0 otherwise. It is well known that the spectral gap δ of P
(δ = 1 − λ, where λ is the second largest eigenvalue of P ) is Ω(1/ℓ) for ℓ ≤ k/2 [BCN89]. Now we
describe the random walk on G.
Let the current vertex is u = {u1, u2, · · · , uℓ} and ru = ru1 + ru2 + · · · + ruℓ . With probability 1/2
stay at u and with probability 1/2 do the following: randomly pick ui ∈ u and j ∈ [k] \ u. Then move to
vertex v such that v is obtained from u by removing ui and inserting j. Compute rv by simply subtracting
rui from ru and adding rj to it. That will only cost 2 oracle access. Staying in any vertex with probability
1/2 ensures that the random walk is ergodic. So the stationary distribution of the random walk is always
uniform. It is easy to see that the transition matrix of the random walk is A = (I + P )/2 where I is the
identity matrix of suitable dimension. So the spectral gap of the transition matrix A is δˆ = (1−λ)/2 = δ/2.
Now, in the following theorem we present the analysis of the query complexity.
Theorem 3.8 Let R be a finite ring given as an oracle and f(x1, · · · , xm) be a multilinear polynomial
over R given as a black-box. Moreover let {r1, · · · , rk} is a given additive generating set for R. Then the
quantum query complexity of identity testing of f is O(m(1 + α)m/2k mm+1 ) assuming k ≥ (1 + 1/α)m+1.
Proof. Our algorithm analysis is similar to the analysis of [MN05].
Setup cost(S): For the quantum walk step we need to start with an uniform distribution on Smℓ . With
each u ∈ Sℓ, we maintain a quantum register |du〉 that computes ru. So we need to prepare the following
state |Ψ〉:
|Ψ〉 = 1√|Smℓ |
∑
u1,u2,··· ,um∈Smℓ
|u1, ru1〉 ⊗ |u2, ru2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |um, rum〉.
It is easy to see that to compute any ruj we need ℓ − 1 oracle access to the ring oracle. Since in each
of m independent walk, quantum queries over all choices of u will be made in parallel (using quantum
superposition), the total query cost for setup is m(ℓ− 1).
Update cost(U): It is clear from the random walk described in the section 3.1.1, that the update cost over
Sℓ is only 2 oracle access. Thus for the random walk on Smℓ which is just m independent random walks, one
on each copy of Sℓ, we need a total update cost 2m.2
2In [MN05] the underlying group operation is not necessarily commutative (it is being tested for commutativity). Thus the
update cost is more.
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Checking cost(C): To check whether f is zero on a point during the walk, we simply query the oracle
for f once.
Recall from Szegedy’s result [Sze04] (as stated in Theorem 3.2), the total cost for query complex-
ity is Q = S + 1√
δˆǫ
(U + C) where ǫ =
(
1−p
2
)m
is the proportion of the marked elements and δˆ
is the spectral gap of the transition matrix A described in section 3.1.1. Combining together we get,
Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3√
δˆǫ
]
. From the random walk described in the section 3.1.1, we know that δˆ ≥ 12ℓ .
Hence, Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3
√
2ℓ
( 1−p2 )
m
2
]
. Notice that, 1−p2 =
ℓ
k
(
1− ℓ
k
1− 1
k
)
. Substituting for 1−p2 we get,
Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3√2km/2 1
ℓ
m−1
2 ( k−ℓk−1)
m/2
]
. We will choose a suitably small α > 0 so that k−1k−ℓ < 1 + α.
Then we can upper bound Q as follows. Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3√2 · (1 + α)m/2km/2 1
ℓ
m−1
2
]
. Now our goal
is to minimize Q with respect to ℓ and α. For that we choose ℓ = kt where we will fix t appropriately in
the analysis. Substituting ℓ = kt we get, Q ≤ m
[
(kt − 1) + 3√2 · (1 + α)m/2t1/2km−(m−1)t2
]
. Choosing
t = (m/(m + 1)), we can easily see that the query complexity of the algorithm is O(m(1 + α)m/2k
m
m+1 ).
Finally, recall that we need choose an α > 0 so that k−1k−ℓ ≤ 1 + α. Clearly, it suffices to choose α so
that (1 + α)ℓ ≤ αk. Letting ℓ = km/m+1 we get the constraint (1 + 1/α)m+1 ≤ k which is satisfied if
e(m+1)/α ≤ k. We can choose α = m+1ln k .
Remark. The choice of α in the above theorem shows some trade-offs in the query complexity between
the parameters k and m. For constant m notice that this gives us an O(km/m+1) query upper bound for the
quantum algorithm.
Finally, it is easy to observe that the quantum algorithm and its analysis given in Theorem 3.8 hold for
a more general problem stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9 Let R be a black-box finite ring given by ring oracle and suppose A = 〈r1, r2, · · · , rk〉 is
an additive subgroup of R given by generators ri ∈ R. Let f(x1, x2, · · · , xm) be a black-box multilinear
polynomial f : Rm → R. There is a quantum algorithm with query complexity O(m(1 + α)m/2k mm+1 )
(assuming k ≥ (1 + 1/α)m+1), to check if f = 0 is an identity for the additive abelian group A.3
4 A reduction from m-SPLIT COLLISION problem
We can easily show that any classical algorithm for the MIT problem must make Ω(k) queries. This is an easy
consequence of observations in [MN05]. Specifically, an Ω(k) is shown in [MN05]for commutativity testing
of a black-box group G given by k generators. It is a consequence of the randomized query complexity for
the UNIQUE SPLIT COLLISION problem. The lower bound argument applies to MIT as well, implying an
Ω(k) query lower bound for the problem.
We do not have an explicit lower bound result for the quantum query complexity of multilinear iden-
tity testing problem (MIT) on rings. However, in this section we show that the more general problem
3I.e. checking if f(a1, · · · , am) = 0 for all ai ∈ A.
of multilinear identity testing for additive subgroups (described in Theorem 3.9) is at least as hard as
m-SPLIT COLLISION, which is a version of the m-COLLISION problem.
We first describe some automata theory that is useful for our reduction.
4.1 Automata theory background
We recall some standard automata theory notation (see, for example, [HU78]). Fix a finite automaton
A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, qf ) which takes as input strings in Σ∗. Q is the set of states of A, Σ is the alphabet, δ :
Q×Σ→ Q is the transition function, and q0 and qf are the initial and final states respectively (throughout,
we only consider automata with unique accepting states). For each letter b ∈ Σ, let δb : Q → Q be the
function defined by: δb(q) = δ(q, b). These functions generate a submonoid of the monoid of all functions
from Q to Q. This is the transition monoid of the automaton A and is well-studied in automata theory: for
example, see [Str94, page 55]. We now define the 0-1 matrix Mb ∈ F|Q|×|Q| as follows: Mb(q, q′) = 1 if
δb(q) = q
′
, and 0 otherwise.
The matrix Mb is simply the adjacency matrix of the graph of the function δb. As the entries of Mb are
only zeros and ones, we can consider Mb to be a matrix over any field F.
Furthermore, for any w = w1w2 · · ·wk ∈ Σ∗ we define the matrix Mw to be the matrix product
Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mwk . If w is the empty string, define Mw to be the identity matrix of dimension |Q| × |Q|.
For a string w, let δw denote the natural extension of the transition function to w; if w is the empty string, δw
is simply the identity function. It is easy to check that: Mw(q, q′) = 1 if δw(q) = q′ and 0 otherwise. Thus,
Mw is also a matrix of zeros and ones for any string w. Also, Mw(q0, qf ) = 1 if and only if w is accepted
by the automaton A. We now describe the reduction.
Theorem 4.1 The m-SPLIT COLLISION problem reduces to multilinear polynomial identity testing (MIT)
for additive subgroups of black-box rings.
Proof. An instance of m-SPLIT COLLISION is a function f : [k]→ [k] given as an oracle, where we assume
w.l.o.g. that k = nm. Divide {1, 2, · · · , k} into m intervals I1, I2, · · · , Im, each containing n consecutive
points of [k]. Recall that f has an m-collision if for some j ∈ [k] we have |f−1(j)| = m. Furthermore, f is
said to have an m-split collision if for some j ∈ [k] we have |f−1(j)| = m and |f−1(j) ∩ Ii| = 1 for each
interval Ii.
Consider the alphabet Σ = {b, c, b1, b2, · · · , bm}. For each i ∈ [k], define the k-tuple ri over Σ as
follows: ri[i] = b and ri[f(i)] = bj where i ∈ Ij . For an index s ∈ [k] \ {i, f(i)} define ri[s] = c.
Let A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, qf ) be a deterministic finite state automaton that accepts all strings w ∈ Σ∗ such
that each bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m occurs at least once in w. It is easy to see that such an automaton with a single
final state qf can be designed with total number of states |Q| = 2O(m) = t. W.l.o.g. let the set of states Q
be renamed as {1, 2, · · · , t}, where 1 is the initial state and t is the final state.
For each letter a ∈ Σ, let Ma denote the t× t transition matrix for δa (as defined in Section 4.1). Since
each Ma is a t × t 0-1 matrix, each Ma is in the ring Mt(F2) of t × t matrices with entries from the field
F2. Let R denote the k-fold product ring (Mt(F2))k. Clearly, R is a finite ring (which is going to play the
role of the black-box ring in our reduction). We now define an additive subgroup T of R, where we describe
the generating set of T using the m-SPLIT COLLISION instance f .
For each index i ∈ [k], define an k-tuple Ti ∈ R as follows. Let Ti[i] = Mb, Ti[f(i)] = Mbj (where
i ∈ Ij) and for each index s 6∈ {i, f(i)} define Ti[s] = Mc. The additive subgroup of R we consider is
T = 〈T1, T2, · · · , Tk〉 generated by the Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Furthermore, define two t× t matrices A and B in Mt(F2) as follows. Let A[1, 1] = 1 and A[u, ℓ] = 0
for (u, ℓ) 6= (1, 1). For the matrix B, let B[t, 1] = 1 and B[u, ℓ] = 0 for (u, ℓ) 6= (t, 1).
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Claim 4.2 Let w = w1w2 · · ·wt ∈ Σ∗ be any string. Then the automaton A defined above accepts w if and
only if the matrix AMw1Mw2 · · ·MwtB is nonzero.
Proof of Claim By definition of the matrices Ma, the (1, k)th entry of the product Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mwt is 1 if
and only if w is accepted by A. By definition of the matrices A and B the claim follows immediately.
Now, consider the polynomial P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) in noncommuting indeterminates x1, · · · , xm with
coefficients from the matrix ring R defined as follows:
P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) = A¯x1x2 · · · xmB¯,
where A¯ = (A,A, . . . , A) ∈ R and B¯ = (B,B, · · · , B) ∈ R are k-tuples of A’s and B’s respectively. We
claim that the multilinear polynomial P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) = 0 is an identity for the additive subgroup T if
and only if f has no m-split collision.
Claim 4.3 P (x1, · · · , xm) = 0 is an identity for the ring T = 〈T1, · · · , Tk〉 if and only if f has no m-split
collision.
Proof of Claim Suppose f has an m-split collision. Specifically, let ij ∈ Ij 1 ≤ j ≤ m be indices such that
f(i1) = · · · = f(im) = ℓ. In the polynomial P , we substitute for indeterminate xj by Tij for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Consider the product M = Ti1 · · ·Tim in the ring T . This product is an k-tuple of t× t matrices such that in
the ℓth component M has the matrix
∏m
t=1Mbt where it ∈ It. Since bi1bi2 · · · bim ∈ Σ∗ is a length m-string
containing all the bj’s it will be accepted by the automaton A. Consequently, the (q0, qf )th entry of the
matrix M , which is the (1, k)th entry, is 1 (as explained in Section 4.1). It follows that the (1, 1) entry of
the matrix AMB is 1. Hence P = 0 is not an identity over the ring T .
For the other direction, assume that f has no m-split collision. We need to show that P = 0 is an identity
for the ring T . For any m elements S1, S2, · · · , Sm ∈ T consider P (S1, S2, · · · , Sm) = A¯S1S2 · · ·SmB¯.
Since Each Sj is an F2-linear combination of the generators T1, · · · , Tk, it follows by distributivity in the
ring R that P (S1, S2, · · · , Sm) is an F2-linear combination of terms of the form P (Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tkm) for
some m indices k1, · · · , km ∈ [k]. Thus, it suffices to show that P (Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tkm) = 0.
Let Tˆ = Tk1Tk2 · · ·Tkm . Then, for each j ∈ [k] we have Tˆ [j] = Tk1 [j]Tk2 [j] · · · Tkm [j]. Since f has
no m-split collision, for each j ∈ [N ] the set of matrices {Mb1 ,Mb2 , · · · ,Mbm} is not contained in the set
{T1[j], T2[j], · · · , Tk[j]}. Thus, Tˆ [j] = Tk1 [j]Tk2 [j] · · · Tkm [j] is a product of matrices Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mwm
for a word w = w1w2 · · ·wm that is not accepted byA. It follows from the previous claim that ATˆ [j]B = 0.
Hence P (Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tkm) = 0 which completes the proof.
Acknowledgment. We thank Ashwin Nayak for comments and suggestions.
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